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We address the problem of the information-disturbance trade-off associated to the estimation of a
quantum transformation, and show how the extraction of information about the a black box causes
a perturbation of the corresponding input-output evolution. In the case of a black box performing a
unitary transformation, randomly distributed according to the invariant measure, we give a complete
solution of the problem, deriving the optimal trade-off curve and presenting an explicit construction
of the optimal quantum network.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the key features of quantum theory is the impos-
sibility of extracting information from a system without
producing disturbance on its state, the only exception to
this rule being the trivial case when the state belongs
to a set of orthogonal states. A canonical illustration
of the unavoidable disturbance caused by quantum mea-
surements is Heisenberg’s γ-ray microscope thought ex-
periment [1]. The impossibility of a non-disturbing ex-
traction of information is the working principle of quan-
tum cryptography, whose security relies on the fact that
any amount of information extracted by the eavesdrop-
per causes a corresponding amount of disturbance that
can be detected by the communicating parties. A quanti-
tative expression of such information-disturbance trade-
off is a non-trivial issue because there are many different
ways to quantify “information” and “disturbance”, which
have been put forward in the literature [2–16].
All the scenarios analyzed in the past have one point in
common: they concern the disturbance produced by mea-
surements on quantum states. However, one can consider
other scenarios where the measurements produce a dis-
turbance on quantum transformations. For example, we
may have a black box implementing an unknown trans-
formation belonging to a set {Ei}, with the restriction
that the black box can be used only one time. On the one
hand, we may try to identify the unknown transforma-
tion (that is, to find out the index i). On the other hand,
we may want to use the black box on a variable input
state. Clearly, in general the two tasks are incompatible:
In this case there is a trade-off between the amount of
information that can be extracted about a black box and
the disturbance caused on its action. In other words, we
cannot estimate an unknown quantum dynamics without
perturbing it. Therefore, it is important to find a quanti-
tative formulation of the information-disturbance trade-
off, and to find the optimal scheme that introduces the
minimum amount of disturbance for any given amount of
extracted information. Like the trade-off for states, the
trade-off for transformations is relevant to the discussion
of quantum cryptographic protocols where the secret key
is encoded in a set of transformations, as it happens in
the two-way protocols of Refs. [17–19] for finite dimen-
sional systems, and in the protocol of Ref. [20] for con-
tinuous variables. Here for simplicity we will restrict our
attention to the case of unitary transformations on finite
dimensional quantum systems. Like in Refs. [7, 11] we
will quantify the information gain and the disturbance
with suitable fidelities, and we will derive the minimum
amount of disturbance associated to any possible value
of the information gain.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section II we
introduce the problem and the notation. Section III
then provides a brief review of the formalism of quan-
tum combs and generalized instruments [21–23], which
is crucial in our paper. The complete analysis of the
information-disturbance trade-off for arbitrary unitary
transformations will be presented in Section IV: in par-
ticular, we will first give the rigorous mathematical for-
mulation of the problem (Subsec. IVA ), the analysis of
its symmetries IVB, the derivation of the optimal trade-
off curve (IVC), and, finally, the construction of the op-
timal network (IVD). We conclude the paper with a
discussion of the results in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
In the case of states, the mathematical tool to an-
alyze the information-disturbance trade-off is provided
by the notion of quantum instrument. In the discrete-
2outcome case, a quantum instrument is a set of quantum
operations (trace-decreasing completely positive maps)
{Ti} transforming operators on the input system Hilbert
spaceH0 to operators on the output system Hilbert space
H1, with the normalization condition that T :=
∑
i Ti is
trace-preserving (that is, it is a quantum channel). A
quantum instrument describes a measurement process
that outputs the classical outcome i and the quantum
state Ti(ρ)/Tr[Ti(ρ)] with probability pi = Tr[Ti(ρ)]. To
derive our results we will use the generalization of the no-
tion of instrument to measurement processes on quantum
transformations, rather than on quantum states [21–23].
This extension will be presented in Section III.
In the following we will denote the linear operators on
a Hilbert space H by L(H). We will make extensive use
of the isomorphim between linear operators in L(H) and
vectors in H⊗H given by
A =
∑
nm
〈n|A |m〉 |n〉 〈m| ↔ |A〉〉 =
∑
nm
〈n|A |m〉 |n〉 |m〉
(1)
where {|n〉} is a fixed orthonormal basis for H. The iso-
morphism satisfies the property
|A〉〉 = (A⊗ I)|I〉〉 = (I ⊗ AT )|I〉〉 (2)
T denoting transposition with respect to the fixed basis.
For the sake of clarity we will often use the notation Ha,b
to denote the tensor product Ha⊗Hb, Aa,b to stress that
A belongs to (Ha,b), and, similarly, |ψ〉a and |A〉〉a,b to
stress that |ψ〉 belongs to Ha and |A〉〉 belongs to Ha,b.
Using the Choi isomorphism [24], we can associate each
completely positive map Ti : L(H0) → L(H1) with a
positive operator Ti ∈ L(H1 ⊗H0) given by
Ti = (Ti ⊗ I0)(|I〉〉〈〈I|0,0) (3)
I0 being the identity map on H0.
In terms of the Choi operator, the condition that T is
trace-preserving (resp. trace-decreasing) becomes
Tr1[T ] = I0 (reps.Tr1[T ] ≤ I0) (4)
where Tr1 denotes partial trace over H1.
We now introduce the trade-off problem for quantum
transformations. Consider a quantum network R with
an empty slot that can be linked with a variable quan-
tum device, the input-output action of the latter being
described by a channel in the set {Ei}. Ideally, we would
like the networkR to give us some information about the
channel Ei without affecting the output state Ei(ρ) that
the channel should produce when an input state ρ is fed
in the corresponding device. (see Fig. 1). However, as
already mentioned, this is not possible in general.
As we already mentioned, there are two extreme sit-
uations. On one extreme, if we are only interested in
extracting information, the best strategy is to apply the
channel on one side of a suitable bipartite state σ ∈
L(Ho ⊗H0), thus getting the output state (Ei ⊗ I0)(σ),
and then to perform a suitable measurement {Pj}. In
Ei
R
ρ
j
Ei≈ ρ
FIG. 1. Given a black box implementing an unknown channel
Ei drawn from a set {Ei}, we want to link it with a quantum
network R that both gives an estimate j of the parameter i
and affects the output state Ei(ρ) as little as possible (here
the symbol ≈ means that the network R is optimized in such
a way that the output of the two circuits on the left and on
the right is as close as possible).
this case the available use of the channel is consumed for
estimation: after this step, the best we can do to pro-
duce an output state close to Ei(ρ) is to apply to the
input state ρ some channel E˜j that depends on the out-
come j of our measurement. On the opposite extreme,
if we do not tolerate any disturbance, the only possible
is to apply the black box to the input state ρ. In this
case we correctly obtain the output state Ei(ρ), but we
have no measurement data to infer the identity of the
unknown device. In the intermediate cases, it is impor-
tant to assess the maximum amount of information that
can be gathered without trespassing a given disturbance
threshold.
Since the trade-off problem involves optimization of
quantum networks, we will use the approach of quantum
combs developed in [21–23]. This approach is based on
the characterization of the most general transformations
that quantum channels can undergo, and on realization
theorems proving that all these abstract transformations
can be implemented by quantum networks. Since our
theorems are constructive, this approach will also provide
the explicit form of the optimal quantum network.
III. QUANTUM COMBS AND GENERALIZED
INSTRUMENTS
By stretching and rearranging the internal wires, we
can give to every quantum network the shape of a comb.
The empty slots of the network becomes the empty space
between two teeth of the comb.
. . .
0 1 2 43 2N+12N-1 2N
FIG. 2. A quantum comb with N + 1 teeth. The flow of
quantum information is from left to right. The input wires
of the network are labelled with even numbers from 0 to 2N ,
the output wires with odd numbers from 1 to 2N + 1.
3Referring to Fig. 2, each wire is labeled with a natural
number, which is even for the input wires and odd for
the output ones; the corresponding Hilbert spaces are
labelled accordingly.
If our network consists of a sequence of N quantum
channels (trace-preserving maps), then we call it deter-
ministic. To every deterministic network we can asso-
ciate a positive operator R(N) ≥ 0, called quantum comb,
satisfying the normalization condition [21, 23, 26]
Tr2k−1[R(k)] = I2k−2 ⊗R(k−1) k = 1, . . . , N, (5)
where R(0) = 1, R(k) ∈ L(Houtk ⊗ Hink) with Hink =⊗k−1
n=0H2n and Houtk =
⊗k−1
n=0H2n+1, is the comb of the
reduced circuit obtained by discarding the last N − k
teeth.
The normalization condition of Eq. (5) reflects the
causal ordering in the deterministic network. We will call
a comb satisfying Eq. (5) deterministic, and we will de-
note by DetComb(
⊗2N−1
i=0 Hi) the set of all deterministic
combs with the given ordering of the input and output
spaces. A deterministic quantum comb with N = 1 is
simply the Choi operator of a quantum channel: in this
case the condition of Eq. (5) is equivalent to the nor-
malization of the channel given in Eq. (4). Accordingly,
DetComb(Hb⊗Ha) will be the set of (Choi operators of)
quantum channels from L(Ha) to L(Hb).
This framework of quantum combs can be easily ex-
tended to the case of networks consisting of quantum
operations (trace-decreasing maps). We call probabilistic
comb a positive operator S(N) ≥ 0 that is bounded by
some deterministic comb, that is, an operator S(N) with
the property
∃R(N) ∈ DetComb
(
2N−1⊗
k=0
Hk
)
such that S(N) 6 R(N)
(6)
We will denote by ProbComb(
⊗2N−1
k=0 Hk) the set of all
probabilistic combs with given ordering of the input and
output spaces. A probabilistic comb with N = 1 is sim-
ply the Choi operator of a quantum operation: in this
case the condition of Eq. (6) is equivalent to the bound
in Eq. (4). Accordingly, ProbComb(Hb ⊗ Ha) will be
the set of (Choi operators of) quantum operations from
L(Ha) to L(Hb).
Two quantum networks R(N) and S(M) can be linked
together by connecting some wires of R(N) with some
wires of S(M . Let us denote by J the set of wires that are
connected and by K (L) the set of wires of R(N) (S(M )
that are not. The circuit resulting from the connection,
denoted by R(N) ∗ S(M), has Choi operator given by the
link product
R(N) ∗ S(M) = TrJ
[(
R
(N)
K,J ⊗ IL
)(
IK ⊗ S(M)TJJ,L
)]
, (7)
where R(N), S(M) are the Choi operators of R(N) and
S(M), respectively, and TJ denotes the partial transposi-
tion with respect to the fixed orthonormal basis of Eq.
(1). For example, let E be a channel from H0 to H1 and
F be a channel from H1 to H2; then the Choi operator
of the composition FE is
F ∗ E = Tr1[(F2,1 ⊗ I0)(I2 ⊗ ET11,0)]. (8)
As a particular case for H0 ≃ C, if ρ is a state on H1
and E is a channel from H1 to H2 one has
E(ρ) = E21 ∗ ρ1 = Tr1[E21(I2 ⊗ ρT1 )]. (9)
A deterministic (probabilistic) quantum comb, besides
representing a quantum network with some empty slots,
can also represent a quantum channel (operation) R(N)
fromHeven :=
⊗N−1
k=0 H2k toHodd :=
⊗N−1
k=0 H2k+1. Due
to the Choi isomorphism, the channel R(N) is in one-to-
one correspondence with the comb R(N). In the follow-
ing two subsections we will exploit this correspondence to
discuss the physical realization of quantum combs, both
in the deterministic case (subsec. III A) and in the prob-
abilistic case (subsec. III B).
A. Realization of deterministic combs
The following theorem, proved in Ref. [27], gives an ex-
plicit construction for the realization of every determin-
istic quantum comb as a sequence of isometric channels.
Theorem 1 (Realization of deterministic combs)
Every deterministic comb can be realized as a concate-
nation of isometric channels in the following way:
0
R(N)
1
2 3
...
...
2N−2 2N−1
=
0
V [1]
1 2
V [2]
3 . . . 2N−2
V [N ]
2N−1
A1 A2 . . . AN−1 AN "%#$I
, (10)
where Ak is an ancilla with Hilbert space HAi , V [k] : L(H2k−2 ⊗ HAk−1) is the channel defined by V [k](ρ) =
4V [k]ρV [k]†, ∀ρ ∈ L(H2k−2 ⊗ HAk−1) for a suitable isom-
etry V [k] : H2k−2 ⊗ HAk−1 → H2k−1 ⊗ HAk , and repre-
sents the partial trace on HAN . Precisely, the ancillary
Hilbert spaces HAk−1 ,HAk are defined by HA0 := C and,
for k ≥ 1 and HAk := Supp(R(k)∗) ⊆
⊗2k−1
n=0 Hn, where
Supp(R(k)∗) denotes the support of the complex conjugate
of R(k) in the fixed basis. The isometry V [k] is given by
the expression
V [k] :=
{
I2k−1 ⊗
[(
R
(k)∗
(2k−1)′,...,0′
) 1
2
(
I(2k−1)′,(2k−2)′ ⊗R(k−1)∗(2k−3)′,...,0′
)− 12 ]} ×
× (|I〉〉(2k−1),(2k−1)′ ⊗ T(2k−2)′←(2k−2) ⊗ I(2k−3)′ ⊗ · · · ⊗ I0′) , (11)
where Hk′ ≃ Hk and Tm←n is the teleportation operator
from Hn to Hm, given by Tm←n =
∑
k |k〉m 〈k|n.
Note that the isometry V [k] defined in Eq. (11) has
the correct input and output Hilbert spaces. Indeed, for
k = 1 one has R(0) = 1 and the isometry V [1], given by
V [1] =
[
I1 ⊗
(
R
(1)∗
1′,0′
) 1
2
]
(|I〉〉1,1′ ⊗ T0→0′), sends vectors
in H0 to vectors in H1⊗HA1 , where HA1 = Supp(R(1)∗1′,0′)
is a subspace of H1′ ⊗ H0′ . For k > 1, since HAk−1 =
Supp(R
(k−1)∗
(2i−3)′,...,0′) is a subspace of H(2k−3)′ ⊗ · · · ⊗H0′ ,
the isometry V [k] sends vectors in H2k−2⊗HAk−1 to vec-
tors in H2k−1 ⊗HAk , as stated by the thesis.
B. Generalized N-instruments
In the discrete-outcome case, a generalized N-
instrument is a set of probabilistic combs {Ri} ⊂
ProbComb(
⊗2N−1
k=0 Hk) satisfying the normalization con-
dition
R(N) :=
∑
i
Ri ∈ DetComb(
2N−1⊗
k=0
Hk). (12)
When N = 1 the notion of generalized instrument co-
incides with the usual notion of quantum instrument.
Every N -instrument can be realized as a quantum net-
work, due to an analogue of Ozawa’s dilation theorem
[29]. The proof of the dilation theorem for generalized
N -instruments was originally presented in Ref. [23], and
is combined here with Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (Realization of N-instruments)
Every generalized N-instrument {R(N)i } ⊂
ProbComb(
⊗2N−1
k=0 Hk) can be realized as a quan-
tum network of isometric channels followed by a
measurement one the last ancilla, as follows: Here Ak,
HAk , and V [k] are the ancillas, the Hilbert spaces, and
the isometries providing the realization of the determin-
istic comb R(N) =
∑
iR
(N)
i , as given by Theorem 1.
represents the partial trace on HAN with the operator
Pi. {Pi} is a quantum measurement on the ancilla AN ,
described by the POVM
Pi =
(
R(N)∗
)− 12
R
(N)∗
i
(
R(N)∗
)− 12
. (13)
In our study of the information-disturbance trade-
off we will use generalized 2-instruments, which can be
graphically represented by combs with two teeth and one
empty slot where the unknown black box can be inserted,
as in Fig. 1. Since the value of N is fixed to N = 2, in the
following we will drop the index (N) in R
(N)
i and R
(N)
and simply write Ri and R.
IV. INFORMATION-DISTURBANCE
TRADEOFF FOR UNITARY CHANNELS
A. Formulation of the problem
Suppose that a black box performs an unknown uni-
tary channel U(ρ) = UρU †, where the unitary U ∈ SU(d)
is randomly drawn according to the normalized Haar
measure dU . Let H1 ≃ H2 ≃ Cd be the input and
output Hilbert spaces for the unknown channel, respec-
tively. In order to extract information we will then use
a quantum network like that of Eq. (12) with N = 2.
The network will be the described by a generalized 2-
instrument {R
Uˆ
}, the outcome Uˆ ∈ SU(d) being the es-
timate of the unknown parameter U . For every possible
outcome Uˆ , R
Uˆ
is an element of ProbComb(
⊗3
k=0Hk)},
with H0 ≃ H1 ≃ H2 ≃ H3, and one has the normaliza-
tion condition
R :=
∫
SU(d)
dUˆR
Uˆ
∈ DetComb(
3⊗
k=0
Hk), (14)
which is the continuous version of Eq. (12). Since there
will be no ambiguity, from now on we will omit the do-
main of integration SU(d).
When the unknown black box with channel U is con-
nected to the quantum network with generalized instru-
ment {R
Uˆ
}, one obtains a set of quantum operations
R
Uˆ
∗ U , each corresponding to a possible result of the
5measurement. However, to speak about the “the proba-
bility of the outcome Uˆ” we need to know what input
state ρ is fed in the circuit: we cannot speak of the
“probability of a quantum operation” without specify-
ing its input state. If the input state is ρ ∈ L(H0), then
the probability is given by the trace of the output state
(R
Uˆ
∗ U)(ρ):
p(Uˆ |U, ρ) = Tr[(R
Uˆ
∗ U)(ρ)]
= Tr[R
Uˆ
(I3 ⊗ |U∗〉〉〈〈U∗|2,1 ⊗ ρ∗0)], (15)
where we used the link product of Eq. (7) and Eq. (9)
to compute the Choi operator of R
Uˆ
∗ U and the action
of the channel R
Uˆ
∗ U on the state ρ, respectively. We
also used the fact that AT = A∗ for every self-adjoint
operator.
To quantify the information gain and the disturbance
we now introduce two suitable fidelities. Suppose that
the black box performs the unitary channel U and that
the measurement outcome is Uˆ . In this case we quantify
information gain with the fidelity
g(Uˆ , U) =
1
d2
|Tr[UˆU †]|2 (16)
Note that the maximum value of the fidelity is 1, and is
achieved if and only if Uˆ = ωU for some phase |ω| = 1,
that is, if and only if the two unitary channels Uˆ and
U coincide. The fidelity g(Uˆ , U) enjoys the invariance
property
g(Uˆ , U) = g(V UˆW, V UW ) ∀V,W ∈ SU(d). (17)
Averaging the fidelity with the probability of the estimate
Uˆ given the true value U and the input state ρ, we then
obtain the average information gain
Gρ :=
∫
dU
∫
dUˆp(Uˆ |U, ρ)g(Uˆ , U). (18)
In our analysis we will always assume that the input state
is given by ρ = I/d. The reason for this choice is that
the condition ρ = I/d arises in two relevant scenarios:
1. when the input system (wire 0) of the circuit is
prepared in a maximally entangled state with some
reference system 0′. This is the case in the cryp-
tographic protocols of Refs. [17, 19] (and, in the
infinite energy limit, also in in the continuous vari-
able scenario of Ref. [20] ).
2. when the input system is prepared at random in
one of the states of an ensemble {ρi, pi}, with the
property that
∑
i piρi = I/d. This is the case of
the cryptographic protocol of Ref. [18].
Since we are setting ρ = I/d, we will drop the subscript
ρ in Gρ. Using Eqs. (15) and (16), the expression for the
information gain G is
G =
1
d3
∫
dU
∫
dUˆ Tr3,0[〈〈U∗|2,1RUˆ |U∗〉〉2,1]|〈〈Uˆ |U〉〉|2.
(19)
We now introduce our figure of merit for the minimiza-
tion of the disturbance. To this purpose, we consider the
channel fidelity [28] between the overall quantum oper-
ation R
Uˆ
∗ U performed by the network and the input
channel U . This is the fidelity between the two output
states produced by the two operations R
Uˆ
∗ U and U
when applied on one side of the maximally entangled
state |Φ〉〉 = 1√
d
|I〉〉0,0′ . In terms of Choi operators, the
channel fidelity is given by
F (R
Uˆ
∗ U ,U) = 1
d2
〈〈U |3,0
(
R
Uˆ
∗ |U〉〉〈〈U |2,1
) |U〉〉3,0
=
1
d2
〈〈U |3,0〈〈U∗|2,1RUˆ |U〉〉3,0|U∗〉〉2,1,
where we used the fact that, by definition of Choi opera-
tor (Eq. (3)), one has (E ⊗ I)(|Φ〉〉〈〈Φ|) = E/d for every
quantum operation E .
Averaging over the outcomes and the true values we
then obtain the average fidelity
F :=
1
d2
∫
dU
∫
dUˆ〈〈U |3,0〈〈U∗|2,1RUˆ |U〉〉3,0|U∗〉〉2,1
=
1
d2
∫
dU〈〈U |3,0〈〈U∗|2,1R|U〉〉3,0|U∗〉〉2,1. (20)
Note that the fidelity F naturally arises also in the
case where the input state at the wire 0 is a pure state
ϕ = |ϕ〉 〈ϕ| chosen at random according to the uniform
measure on pure states: in this case the fidelity between
R
Uˆ
∗U(ϕ) and U(ϕ), averaged over ϕ,U , and Uˆ , is given
by
F ′ =
∫
dϕ
∫
dU
∫
dUˆ Tr[(UϕU †)
(R
Uˆ
∗ U) (ϕ)]
=
∫
dϕ
∫
dU
∫
dUˆ Tr[
(
R
Uˆ
∗ |U〉〉〈〈U |2,1
)
(UϕU † ⊗ ϕ∗)]
=
∫
dϕ
∫
dU 〈Uϕ|3 〈〈U∗|2,1 〈ϕ∗|0R |Uϕ〉3 |U∗〉〉2,1 |ϕ∗〉0
=
∫
dU
(
d
d+ 1
F (R ∗ U ,U) +
+
1
d(d + 1)
Tr[〈〈U∗|2,1R|U∗〉〉2,1]
)
=
d
d+ 1
F +
1
d+ 1
,
having used the relation∫
dϕϕ ⊗ ϕ∗ = |I〉〉〈〈I| + I ⊗ I
d(d+ 1)
(21)
and the normalization Tr[R] = d2, which follows directly
from Eq. (5) in the N = 2 case with H3 ≃ H2 ≃ H2 ≃
H0 ≃ Cd. Since there is a trade-off, the information
gain G and the fidelity F cannot achieve their maximum
values at the same time. Therefore, we will introduce a
weight 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 that quantifies how much we care about
information extraction versus disturbance minimization,
6and our figure of merit will be the convex combination
pG+(1−p)F . The extreme case p = 0 and (resp. p = 1)
corresponds to the situation where we do not tolerate
any disturbance (resp. where we are only interested in
extracting maximum information). The trade-off curve
obtained by the maximization of pG + (1 − p)F for all
possible values of p ∈ [0, 1] is the same curve that would
be obtained by maximizing F for given G (i.e. by finding
the minimum disturbance for given amount of extracted
information), or by maximizing G for given F (i.e. by
finding the maximum amount of extractable information
for given disturbance threshold).
B. Symmetry of the estimating network
Here we exploit the symmetries of the figure of merit
pG+(1−p)F to simplify the optimization problem. The
crucial simplification comes from the following Theorem,
which states the symmetry properties of the optimal gen-
eralized instrument:
Theorem 3 (Symmetries of the optimal instrument)
Let G and F be the information gain and the fidelity
defined in Eqs. (19) and (20). For every p ∈ [0, 1], the
generalized instrument that maximizes pG + (1 − p)F
can be chosen to be covariant, that is, of the form
R
Uˆ
= (Uˆ3 ⊗ Uˆ∗2 ⊗ I1,0)(Ξ), (22)
for some positive operator Ξ ∈ L(H3 ⊗H2 ⊗H1 ⊗H0).
Moreover, the operator Ξ satisfies the commutation re-
lation
[Ξ, V3 ⊗ V ∗2 ⊗ V1 ⊗ V ∗0 ] = 0 ∀V ∈ SU(d). (23)
Proof. The proof is based on the same argument used
for the proof of Lemma 2 in Ref. [25]. Consider an ar-
bitrary generalized instrument {R
Uˆ
}. Using the invari-
ance of the Haar measure and of the fidelity g(Uˆ , U) (Eq.
(17)), it is easy to check that the values of F and G in
Eqs. (19) and (20) do not change if each R
Uˆ
is replaced
by the group average
R′
Uˆ
:=
∫
dV dW (V3 ⊗ V∗2 ⊗W1 ⊗W∗0 )(RV †UˆW ), (24)
where V ,V∗,W ,W∗ are the unitary channels correspond-
ing to the unitaries V, V ∗,W,W ∗, respectively. Note that
{R′
Uˆ
} is still a generalized instrument, because it satisfies
the normalization condition of Eq. (14). Moreover, from
Eq. (24) is is clear that Ξ := R′I satisfies the commuta-
tion relation of Eq. (23). Finally, from Eq. (24) it is also
clear that for every Uˆ , V,W ∈ SU(d) one has
R′
V UˆW †
= (V3 ⊗ V∗2 ⊗W1 ⊗W∗0 )(R′Uˆ )
Taking Uˆ = W = I one then obtains R′V = (Vˆ3 ⊗ Vˆ∗2 ⊗
I1,0)(Ξ), namely R′Uˆ is of the form of Eq. (22). Since
the substitution {R
Uˆ
} −→ {R′
Uˆ
} can be done for every
generalized instrument, in particular it can be done for
the optimal one. 
Using Theorem 3, we can now express the normaliza-
tion condition of Eq. (14) in a particularly simple way.
Indeed, Eqs. (22) and (23) imply that the normalization
operator R =
∫
dUˆR
Uˆ
satisfies the commutation relation
[R, V3 ⊗ V ∗2 ⊗W1 ⊗W ∗0 ] = 0 ∀V,W ∈ SU(d).
The Schur lemma then implies Tr3[R] = I2 ⊗ R(1)
for some positive operator R(1) ∈ L(H1 ⊗ H0), and
Tr1[R
(1)] = αI0 for some positive number α ∈ R. There-
fore, the normalization condition for R to be a deter-
ministic comb (Eq. (5) for N = 2) becomes trivially
Tr[R] = d2, or, equivalently,
Tr[Ξ] = d2. (25)
C. Optimal trade-off curve
Exploiting Theorem 3 and the Schur’s lemmas we can
now rewrite the figure of merit as:
pG+ (1− p)F = Tr[(pΛG + (1 − p)ΛF )Ξ] (26)
where ΛG and ΛF are the positive operators given by
ΛF :=
1
d2(d2 − 1) [I3,2,1,0 + d
2P3,2 ⊗ P1,0−
− P3,2 ⊗ I1,0 − I3,2 ⊗ P1,0]
ΛG :=
1
d
(I3 ⊗ Tr3,0[ΛF ]⊗ I0) (27)
=
1
d2(d2 − 1)
[(
1− 2
d2
)
I3,2,1,0+
+I3 ⊗ P2,1 ⊗ I0] (28)
P = d−1|I〉〉〈〈I| being the projector on the one-
dimensional invariant subspace of V ⊗ V ∗.
Since the only restrictions on Ξ are positivity and the
normalization given by Eq. (25), the optimal choice is
to take Ξ proportional to the projector on the eigenvec-
tor of pΛG + (1 − p)ΛF corresponding to the maximum
eigenvalue; up to normalization, this eigenvector the can
be shown to be of the form [11]
|χ〉 = x|I〉〉3,0|I〉〉2,1 + y|I〉〉3,2|I〉〉1,0, x, y ∈ R+ (29)
In order to satisfy Eq. (25), we then choose Ξ = |χ〉 〈χ|
with the normalization 〈χ|χ〉 = d2. Reminding Eq. (22)
we get
R
Uˆ
=
∣∣χ
Uˆ
〉 〈
χ
Uˆ
∣∣∣∣χ
Uˆ
〉
:= x|Uˆ〉〉3,0|Uˆ∗〉〉2,1 + y|I〉〉3,2|I〉〉1,0. (30)
The normalization of χ implies that x and y obey the
quadratic equation
x2 + y2 +
2xy
d
= 1 (31)
7Note that in the above equation there is just one free
parameter (either x or y), which can be expressed e.g. as
a function on the trade-off ratio p. Fidelity and gain can
be calculated in terms of the parameters x and y, thus
getting the following expressions
F = 1− d
2 − 2
d2
x2 G =
2− y2
d2
(32)
The extreme situation of minimum disturbance (resp.
maximum extraction of information) can be retrieved in
the extreme case x = 0, y = 1 (resp. y = 1, x = 0).
Indeed, when x = 0, y = 1, one has R
Uˆ
= |I〉〉〈〈I|3,2 ⊗
|I〉〉〈〈I|1,0 for all Uˆ . In this case, there is no informa-
tion extracted and one has R
Uˆ
∗ U = U , that is, the
instrument realizes the identity map. Accordingly, the
fidelity F reaches its maximum F = 1, while the in-
formation gain takes its minimum G = 1
d2
, the value
achieved by a random guess according to the Haar mea-
sure. In the opposite case x = 1, y = 0 one has in-
stead R
Uˆ
= |Uˆ〉〉〈〈Uˆ |3,0 ⊗ |Uˆ∗〉〉〈〈Uˆ∗|2,1, which implies
R
Uˆ
∗ U = |Tr[UˆU †]|2Uˆ . This means that in this case
our circuit performs the optimal estimation of U [25],
and then executes the transformation Uˆ on the input
state. Accordingly, the fidelity drops to its minimum
value F = 2
d2
and the information gain reaches its maxi-
mum G = 2
d2
.
Following Ref. [11] we introduce now the information
variable 0 ≤ I ≤ 1 and the disturbance variable 0 ≤ D ≤
1, given by
I :=
G−Gmin
Gmax −Gmin D :=
Fmax − F
Fmax − Fmin
where Gmax = 2/d
2, Gmin = 1/d
2, Fmin = 2/d
2 and
Fmax = 1. Note that I = 0 (D = 0) corresponds to
no information (no disturbance) and I = 1 (D = 1)
corresponds to maximum information (maximum distur-
bance).
Using Eq. (32) and the definitions of I and D it is
immediate to obtain the relation
x =
√
D y =
√
1− I. (33)
Substituting the above equation in the normalization
condition of Eq. (31) we finally obtain the curve of the
optimal trade-off:
d2(D − I)2 − 4D(1− I) = 0, (34)
D. Optimal quantum network
We now use Theorems 1 and 2 to construct explicitly
the optimal network achieving the trade-off of Fig. 3.
The optimal network will be derived for every possible
value of the parameters x, y with 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1 belonging
to the curve x2 + y2 + 2xy/d = 1. Since x and y can
The corresponding plot is showed in Fig. 3.
FIG. 3. Plot of the minimum disturbance D(I) as a function
of the information I (Eq. (34)), for various values of d: d = 2
solid line, d = 3 dashed line, d = 4 dotted line
be easily expressed in terms of the information I and the
disturbance D (Eq. (33)), our construction provides the
optimal network for very point in the optimal trade-off
curve depicted in Fig. 3.
According to Theorem 2 the generalized instrument
{R
Uˆ
} is implemented as a sequence of N = 2 isometries
V [1] : H0 → H1⊗HA1 and V [2] : H2⊗HA1 → H3⊗HA2 ,
followed by a measurement {P
Uˆ
} on the ancilla A2. The
ancillary Hilbert space HA1 (HA2) is given by HA1 =
Supp(R
(1)∗
1′,0′) ⊆ H1′ ⊗ H0′ (HA2 = Supp(R∗3′,2′,1′,0′) ⊆
H3′ ⊗H2′ ⊗H1′ ⊗H0′ ), with Hk′ ≃ Hk The isometries
V [1], V [2] are obtained from the realization of the deter-
ministic comb R =
∫
dUˆR
Uˆ
(Theorem 1) and the ancilla
measurement is given by the POVM
P
Uˆ
= (R∗)−
1
2∗R∗
Uˆ
(R∗)−
1
2 . (35)
Let us start from the construction of the isometries.
By explicit calculation we find
R =
(
x2d2
d2 − 1 + y
2d2 + 2xyd
)
(P3,2 ⊗ P1,0)+
+
(
x2
d2 − 1
)
(I3,2,1,0 − P3,2 ⊗ I1,0 − I3,2 ⊗ P1,0).
Taking the partial trace on H3 and using the condition
Tr3[R] = I2 ⊗R(1) we then obtain
R(1) =
(x+ dy)2
d
P1,0 +
x2
d
(I − P )1,0,
and, therefore,
(
R(1)∗
) 1
2
=
1√
d
(ydP1,0 + xI1,0) (36)
(
R(1)∗
)− 12
=
√
d
( −yd
x(x + yd)
P1,0 +
1
x
I1,0
)
(37)
8According to Eq. (11), the isometry V [1] : H0 → H1 ⊗
HA1 ⊆ H1,1′,0′ is given by
V [1] =
[
I1 ⊗
(
R
(1)∗
1′,0′
) 1
2
]
(|I〉〉1,1′ ⊗ T0′←0)
=
1√
d
(yT1←0 ⊗ |I〉〉1′,0′ + x|I〉〉1,1′ ⊗ T0′←0)
If we input a pure state |ψ〉 ∈ H0 the output is then the
superposition
V [1] |ψ〉0 =
y√
d
|ψ〉1 |I〉〉1′,0′ +
x√
d
|I〉〉1,1′ |ψ〉0′ .
Intuitively, we can understand the action of V1 as a su-
perposition of two different processes:
1. with amplitude y the quantum state |ψ〉0 is propa-
gated undisturbed from the input system 0 to the
output system 1, so that the unknown unitary U
can act on it. As we will see in the following,
the maximally entangled state |Φ〉〉1′,0′ = 1√
d
|I〉〉1′,0′
will then serve as a resource to teleport the state
U |ψ〉2 to the output node 3.
2. with amplitude x the state |ψ〉0 is transferred to
the ancillary degree of freedom 0′: in this case
the unknown unitary will not act on it, but, in-
stead, it will act on the maximally entangled state
|Φ〉〉1,1′ = 1√
d
|I〉〉1,1′ , thus producing the state
|ΦU 〉〉2,1′ = 1√
d
|U〉2,1′ . As we will see in the fol-
lowing, the state |ΦU 〉〉2,1′ will be used for the opti-
mal estimation of U . Finally, the state |ψ〉0′ will be
transferred to the output system 3, and, depending
on the estimate, a transformation Uˆ will be applied
on it.
The isometry V [2]H2,1′,0′ ⊇ H2 ⊗HA1 → H3 ⊗HA2 ⊆
H3,3′,2′,1′,0′ is given by:
V [2] =
{
I3 ⊗
[(
R∗3′,2′,1′,0′
) 1
2
(
I3′,2′ ⊗R(1)∗1′,0′
)− 12 ]}×
× (|I〉〉3,3′ ⊗ T2′←2 ⊗ I1′,0′) (38)
On the other hand, using Eqs. (35) and (30) the POVM
{P
Uˆ
} on HA2 can be written as
P
Uˆ
=
∣∣η
Uˆ
〉 〈
η
Uˆ
∣∣ ∣∣η
Uˆ
〉
:= (R∗)−
1
2
∣∣χ∗
Uˆ
〉
(39)
Combining the isometry V [2] with the POVM {P
Uˆ
} we
then obtain the instrument {T
Uˆ
}, with T
Uˆ
: L(H2 ⊗
HA2)→ L(H3) given by
T
Uˆ
(ρ) = TrA2 [V
[2]ρV [2]†(I3⊗PUˆ )], ∀ρ ∈ L(H2⊗HA1)
We now use Eqs. (38) and (39) to show that the in-
strument {T
Uˆ
} has a very simple form. To construct T
Uˆ
explicitly we start from the Kraus form T
Uˆ
(ρ) = K
Uˆ
ρK†
Uˆ
,
where the Kraus operator K
Uˆ
is given by
K
Uˆ
= (I3 ⊗
〈
η
Uˆ
∣∣
3′,2′,1′,0′
)V [2]
=
(
I3 ⊗
〈
χ∗
Uˆ
∣∣
3′,2′,1′,0′
)(
I3 ⊗ I3′,2′ ⊗R(1)∗1′,0′
)− 12 ×
× (|I〉〉3,3′ ⊗ T2′←2 ⊗ I1′,0′) ,
having used Eqs. (38) and (39). Now, from Eq. (30)
we have
〈
χ∗
Uˆ
∣∣∣
3′,2′,1′,0′
= 〈χ|3′,2′,1′,0′
(
UˆT3′ ⊗ Uˆ †2′ ⊗ I1′,0′
)
,
and, therefore
K
Uˆ
=
(
I3 ⊗ 〈χ|3′,2′,1′,0′
)(
I3 ⊗ I3′,2′ ⊗R(1)∗1′,0′
)− 12 ×
×
(
|Uˆ〉〉3,3′ ⊗ Uˆ †2′T2′←2 ⊗ I1′,0′
)
,
Finally, inserting Eqs. (29) and (37) in the above expres-
sion we obtain
K
Uˆ
=
√
d
(
〈〈Uˆ |2,1′ ⊗ Uˆ3T3←0′
)
,
which implies that the instrument {T
Uˆ
} is given by
T
Uˆ
(ρ) = Uˆ3T3←0′
(
d〈〈Uˆ |2,1′ρ|Uˆ〉〉2,1′
)
T0′→3Uˆ
†
3 , (40)
where we introduced the redundant notation T0′→3 :=
T †3←0′ =
∑d
n=1 |n〉0′ 〈n|3 ≡ T0′←3, to make the expression
clearer.
The interpretation of Eq. (40) is straightforward: to
implement the instrument {T
Uˆ
} we only have to perform
on system 2 and on the ancila 1′ the Bell measurement
{B
Uˆ
} with POVM B
Uˆ
= d|Uˆ〉〉〈〈Uˆ |, and, depending on
the outcome, to perform the unitary Uˆ on the output
system 3, which is obtained from the ancilla 0′ just by
relabelling (represented here by the teleportation oper-
ator T3←0′). In other workds, the instrument {TUˆ} is
just obtained by a Bell measurement followed by uni-
tary feed-forward. Remarkably, {T
Uˆ
} is independent of
the trade-off parameters x, y: this means that, after we
performed the isometry V [1], the remaining part of the
optimal network is independent of the particular value
of the information-disturbance rate. The reason for this
is that the combination of Bell measurement and feed-
forward realized by the instrument {T
Uˆ
} can work both
as a teleportation protocol (in the case of no-disturbance)
and as an estimate-and-reprepare strategy (in the case of
maximal information extraction).
To summarize the results of this section, we give now
the step-by-step evolution of a pure state |ψ〉0 in the op-
timal quantum network:
|ψ〉0
V [1]−−→ 1√
d
(y |ψ〉1 |I〉〉1′,0′ + x|I〉〉1,1′ |ψ〉0′)
U−→ 1√
d
(yU |ψ〉2 |I〉〉1′,0′ + x|U〉〉2,1′ |ψ〉0′)
√
d〈〈Uˆ|−−−−→ yUˆ †U |ψ〉3 + xTr[UˆU †] |ψ〉3
Uˆ−→ yU |ψ〉3 + xTr[UˆU †]Uˆ |ψ〉3 .
90 2 3
1’
0’
1
V [1]
U
Uˆ
Uˆ
FIG. 4. Optimal quantum network for the information-
disturbance trade-off. The input state |ψ〉 enters from the
wire 0. Then, the isometry V [1] prepares a coherent super-
position 1√
d
(
y |ψ〉1 |I〉〉1′,0′ + x|I〉〉1,1′ |ψ〉0′
)
which is tuned by
the parameters x =
√
D and y =
√
1− I, whose value depend
on the information-disturbance rate. After that, the unknown
unitary U is applied between the nodes 1 and 2 of the network.
Finally, a Bell measurement is performed and, depending on
the result, the unitary transformation Uˆ is performed on the
output system 3.
The action of the whole network is depicted in Fig. 4.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we addressed the fundamental problem of
the information-disturbance trade-off in the estimation of
an unknown quantum transformation. In particular, we
completely solved the problem in the case of a unitary
transformation, randomly distributed according to the
Haar measure.
Interestingly, the analytical expression of the optimal
trade-off curve given in Eq. (34)) happens to coincide
with the trade-off curve for the estimation of a max-
imally entangled state [11]. Note, however, that this
is not a trivial consequence of the Choi isomorphism
U → 1√
d
|U〉: while this mathematical correspondence
is one-to-one, operationally it cannot be inverted with
unit probability. In other words, once the transforma-
tion U has been applied to the maximally entangled state
1√
d
|I〉〉, it is irreversibly degraded, and can be retrieved
only probabilistically. For this reason, there is no op-
erational relation between the information-disturbance
trade-off for unitary transformations and that for max-
imally entangled states (none of them is a primitive for
the other). Indeed, the optimal quantum network for
unitary transformations depicted in Fig. 4 is quite dif-
ferent from the optimal network for maximally entangled
states. In our case the optimal network consists of i) a
first interaction that produces a quantum superposition
with amplitudes depending on the desired information-
disturbance rate and ii) of a Bell measurement followed
by unitary feed-forward.
Besides its fundamental relevance, the information-
disturbance trade-off for transformations is also inter-
esting as a possible eavesdropping strategy in crypto-
graphic protocols where the secret key is encoded in a
set of unitary transformations, as it happens in the two-
way protocols of Refs. [17–20]. Notice, however, that
for protocols where the secret key is encoded in a set of
orthogonal unitaries, like those of Refs. [17, 18, 20], the
security of the protocol is not based on the information-
disturbance trade-off studied in this paper. Indeed, since
the unitaries are orthogonal, they can be estimated and
re-prepared without introducing any disturbance (or just
introducing a vanishing disturbance, in the infinite di-
mensional case). This is the reason why the protocols of
Refs. [17, 18, 20] necessarily require the random switch-
ing between a communication mode and a control mode.
The present analysis is instead relevant for the analy-
sis of the two-way protocol of Ref. [19], which uses
two mutually unbiased bases of orthogonal qubit uni-
taries, given by B1 = {σµ}3µ=0 and B2 = {Uσµ}3µ=0,
where σ0 = I, {σk}3k=1 are the three Pauli matrices, and
U = (I+ i
∑3
k=1 σk)/2 is the rotation of 2pi/3 around the
axis n = 1/
√
3(1, 1, 1). In this case, using the optimal
network is a non-trivial eavesdropping attack. Of course,
since the protocol does not involve all possible qubit uni-
taries, the optimal trade-off curve for the restricted set
B1 ∪ B2 could possibly be more favourable to the eaves-
dropper than the universal trade-off curve derived in this
paper. The analysis of the trade-off for non-universal sets
of unitary transformations and the study of the relations
between information-disturbance trade-off and quantum
cloning for unitary transformations [19] are interesting
directions of future research.
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